



R. Wayne Kraft Memorial Lecture



This annual lecture, part of the university's *Heritage Week* celebration (previously "Patron's Day"), offers a current theological viewpoint related to or informed by the spiritual tradition of the university's patron -- **ST. FRANCIS DE SALES**. Speakers of national prominence are invited to present this lecture on campus. The text that follows is provided for personal enrichment and is not intended as a commercial or professional publication.

Ralph McInerny, Ph.D.

JACQUES MARITAIN: THINKING & PRAYING

February 4, 1998

*Dr. McInerny is the Michael P. Grace Professor of Medieval Studies and
Director of the Jacques Maritain Center at the University of Notre Dame*

Thank you, Dr. Kerr. Bishop, Father President, Reverend Fathers, fellow professors, and fellow students: I am really delighted to be here on this particular occasion. All of the events of today have been delightful. Everyone is witty, everyone has a joke ... I won't try to compete with that! I'm here on a serious mission--to speak to you about Jacques Maritain and what I think to be his peculiar significance for the juncture that we've reached in Catholic higher education at this time.

I am, of course, tempted to say something about the book that Father mentioned -- *On This Rockne* -- which is the first in a new mystery series I've inaugurated. That appeared just before Christmas, and I'm working on another called *Irish Tenure*. After that will come *The Lack of the Irish*. This series, I hope, is destined to go on. The idea of it was to have a series that would present some of the lore of the university where I have spent most of my life, as well as tell an ongoing mystery story. Now the reason for the title of the first one is this. When I was a young instructor at Notre Dame, my first year there, I had an office in the main building, and it turned out that at one time it functioned as the Athletic Department office. One rainy day, I went into a safe that was built into one of the pillars which holds up our golden dome, and I saw packages on the shelves in there. I felt them and they were clearly books. My office mate and I decided to find out what they were. So we opened them and out flowed copies of a novel by Knute Rockne, which had been published in

1925. It was called *The Four Winners: The Hands, The Feet, The Head and the Ball*, and it was set at "The Rock University." Well, my colleague was the sort of person who didn't really know, who wasn't sure we had a football team. He didn't know what the stadium was for! He was very lofty about the fact that sports were played at university. And, I of course, being young and intimidated by this fellow, who was rather eminent, I chuckled within myself until I opened up the book and I saw the dedication of it -- it was to Arnold McInerny, a member of the Notre Dame football team who died during the first World War. Well, immediately I took this very seriously and sent a copy to my father. And this figures into my mystery because the question I asked about that novel is this: How could a man who did so many things so well, as Rockne did, how could he write such a bad novel? He got help from the English department! (I'm kidding ...)

Well, I want to say something about the juncture we seem to have arrived at in Catholic colleges and universities, and the significance that I take Jacques Maritain to have on this particular point. Just a few years ago, as some of you will remember, Alan Bloom published a book called *The Closing of the American Mind*. He has some things to say of a rather depressing sort about contemporary higher education. His empirical base was a rather impressive one, since his career had been spent at Cornell and at Chicago. Yet he described his students in a way that suggested that higher education in the United States was not really fulfilling its function. I was struck by this. And in reading Bloom's book there was no indication in his overview of higher education in the country that there were places where that wasn't happening. This is a kind of declension or decadence of higher education.

And I was reminded of a very different situation emanating from that same university, the University of Chicago, in the 1930's, when Robert Hutchins and Mortimer Adler, in conjunction with people at St. John's (IN) and various other places around the country, were seeking to renew liberal education. When they set out to criticize, and when they did criticize the ongoing activity, they also indicated and were aware that there were alternatives to this on the American scene. They referred to the liberal arts tradition in our Catholic colleges and universities. There was a very close relationship at that time between, for example, Chicago and Notre Dame, precisely because, even though we weren't a Jesuit university, one of the things that they were interested in as reformers was the *ratio studiorum* which had governed Jesuit education for centuries. And they wanted to learn from that in their efforts to renewal.

When Bloom wrote, there was no indication that there was an alternative. And I think that tells us something about what has happened, what has been going on in Catholic colleges and universities. When I was a young professor, John Tracy Ellis published a very influential essay in which he was very critical about Catholic higher education. He asked questions like: Where are the Catholic Einsteins? (always a good question!) Where are the Catholic Hemingways? And so forth. And the questions were such that, as you went through them in a sort of examination of conscience, you thought: "Gee, we're not doing too well."

Well, it's always nice to know that you are not doing something as well as you should be doing it! And there grew up the notion that what we had to pursue in our institutions of higher learning was "excellence." And, of course, that is exactly what one should be pursuing. But what happened that was fateful in those efforts -- not fatal, but fateful -- was this. When we asked ourselves, "How

can we achieve excellence in our Catholic colleges and universities?", there was a tendency to say: "Well, where is excellence to be found?" So we looked to models, very often the Ivy League, and decided that we should imitate what they were doing. And pretty much that is what we've done, I think. For example, we tend to send our young men off to Ivy League schools to be trained and educated. When we hire new people, graduates of those schools tended to be thought of very highly on the short list for jobs in our colleges and universities. And we learned a lot from that particular experiment.

Now, if it had been the case, and it was and is the way in many places, if it is the case that what we were seeking to do is to do ever so much better than what we were already doing, and to profit from the things that were being done in a different tradition elsewhere, then clearly the net results would have been an amalgam that would have distinguished Catholic universities from everyone else and nonetheless been in continuity with their tradition. That is, if the effort had been one of supplementing, rather than replacing, a conception of what we were up to, then, I think, the excellence that would have been achieved would have put us in a better situation than we are now.

Why do I say that? Because Bloom's book tells us something about the plight of those models of excellence that we selected. That is, if everything had been going well in secular higher education, and we sought to learn things from imitating the way they were doing it, the results would have been of a certain kind. But the fact of the matter is, we live at a moment when, by general consensus in the academic world, we have seen the defeat of the Enlightenment enterprise. We hear on all sides about this being a postmodern era in culture and in education. That is, the ideal that sustained secular higher education, the Enlightenment ideal, has, by general consent, failed. And part of what Bloom was noticing in these very prestigious universities at which he taught was precisely that failure as it showed up in his students.

How do we describe that failure? How did Bloom put it? Well, he puts it this way (and this has been mentioned on other occasions today): Students tend to think that any viewpoint, or any judgment, is merely the expression of a private attitude, on the basis of which any judgment is as good as any other, because, presumably, unless we're lying, we are accurately expressing the way we feel about something. Now this was Bloom's lament, I think, reduced to a single point: that students have no idea that there are objective criteria for saying something or other, such that, according to those objective criteria, you might be wrong, and it didn't then much matter that you really were sincere in saying what you were saying. One of the points of being in a discussion, at a university level, would be to find out that, "My gosh, I'm wrong and there are standards according to which I can see that I am wrong." And that, of course, is to learn something very important. But it was as if we were playing without a net. There are no standards anymore, and all you had to do was to speak with sincerity and say: "Well, the way I feel is ..." and that would do it. And if somebody else sincerely expressed an opinion, well, what would happen?

Let me refer you to another book of a few years back by my one-time colleague, Alasdair MacIntyre, who has written a series of books which are as important in the sociology of knowledge and the history of ideas as I think any series written in this century. The first one was called *After Virtue*. In it MacIntyre noted this. [MacIntyre was a philosopher. He has lots of faults -- he's a philosopher -- and he has held just about every known position in philosophy. But he's a moral

philosopher, a man of great perception, a man who has learned from his mistakes.] He recalls the fact that at the beginning of this century there was a very influential book by G.E. Moore called *Principia Ethica*. It's sort of "that out of which everything came." It was the book that influenced Doonesbury, and so it had a big effect in a literary and cultural way as well as philosophically. In that particular book, and I won't bore you with a resume of it, but in it we found the fact/value dichotomy made canonical in a fallacy such that if you tried to justify a value judgment (i.e., you said that this was good to do and that was bad to do) and you tried to justify that by appeal to the way things are, you would be guilty of the so-called naturalistic fallacy. In other words, a gap had been opened between descriptive statements about the world and moral evaluation. Descriptive statements about the world were still regarded -- this was destined, too, to come under fire -- but they were still regarded as true or false. But value judgments, and even the aesthetic as well as moral judgments, there's just no way in which you can say one is preferable to the other by appealing to what you are talking about.

Now, there was a theory that developed up and away from this. One can tell that this was MacIntyre's, and one can tell the history of Anglo-American moral philosophy in the 20th Century as reigning in the changes on this fact/value dichotomy. One of the particular theories that came along, advanced by C. L. Stevenson at the University of Michigan, was called emotivism. And he has developed what, as I mentioned earlier we're all familiar with, that when I say of a particular action that it's good or bad, I'm not picking out some fact about it. I'm not pointing to anything objective in it. I'm merely reacting to it. So, let's say that you and I were out playing golf and we come over a hill in the fairway, and we see a woman using a 7-iron on her husband. You say, "Oh, what a nice takeaway, she's not bending her elbow, and great follow-through." And you like it, so you approve of it. And I say, "My Lord, what a horrible thing to do!" (Violence on the golf course ... unheard of!) So, here you have an action, an activity, two observers, and you approve of it and I disapprove. Who's right? Nobody. And you and I could describe to a fault what is going on there, and be in perfect agreement, but when I say "good" and you say "bad," according to emotivism, you're expressing your feelings about the events and I'm expressing mine.

Now, one of the effects of that, of course, is that we can't disagree. It's sort of like my saying I have a headache and you saying you don't. This is not a conflict. So, we're confronted with the trivialization, we might say, of value language as a result of this. We go on doing it, and we give this kind of explanation, but we're just expressing our feelings.

Now, what MacIntyre suggested was this. This is no longer one meta-ethical theory among others; this is what *everybody* now holds. And he used the phrase that we live now at a time of "universal emotivism" -- that is, everybody has adopted, practically speaking, that a moral judgment is merely the expression of a subjective or private disposition of the speaker and cannot be adjudicated by appeal to facts or the way things are. This is universally the case, McIntyre suggests.

One can easily verify it by looking at the letters to the editors, of even a student newspaper, where someone will write in indignantly about what somebody else has said and say they're trying to impose their views on other people. What's latent in that is the idea that moral views don't travel, that there's no objective way in which you can get someone to adopt your moral views. Maybe

you'll persuade them, maybe they like you and they may want to say the same things as you, but they can't really agree with you. We're saying that's the world we live in now, that's the culture we live in, and that's the culture, of course, of moral relativity. If we add to this the fact that there now is a tendency to think that even descriptive judgments are not true or false, we get a deep, deep theory that all of our statements about the world are really statements about ourselves. They're a way in which we construe experience. So they're not objective.

Now this, of course, goes back to earlier things in philosophy, such as Kant's distinction between the *noumena* and the *phenomena*, but now it's present in a way in which there really is nothing real that you're failing to talk about. With Kant, at least, there were real things, but you can't know them. So, if you talked and developed theories, these were about appearances or phenomena, but in some funny way they were still appearances of things which you couldn't directly know in the *noumenal* or real world but were just out of our reach. What happens when the *noumenal* drops out is that you're left with just *phenomena*. And this is not confined just to bored epistemologists. You find this among philosophers of science, as well -- that's what science is, just a story that we tell. It's not true, it's not about the world, it's about us, about our minds. We construe things this way, and it has some sort of practical advantage, but we could change it in a minute. And it wouldn't be that the previous theory was false; we just simply try another one that would be equally true or equally false.

Now, it's a high crime and misdemeanor to summarize things in this particular way, or it would be if we didn't have so many people like Bloom and MacIntyre within the academy who were self-describing their context, their situation, in this way. This is not an external criticism. This is not the criticism of a Catholic philosopher looking at secular education, and saying, "Oh my, isn't that awful." This is just listening to what people are saying, and they're saying that it's a mess in here. We no longer have any way in which we could seriously talk on moral ideals, on what human life is all about, about what people are alive for, about what counts and what doesn't. We cannot say that even the most learned scientific theories are telling us anything about reality -- it's all about ourselves. So if we have a twin failure here, certainly from any traditional point, it is relativism and epistemological nihilism.

If this is true, if this is even fifty percent true of the situation in secular education, particularly in the most prestigious campuses in this country, you can see how unwise it would be to model your effort on that particular kind of approach. I have come to think that, because we went too far down that particular line, we are not as able as we should be to offer a tremendous service to the country and to higher education, that is, really to serve as an alternative of a serious kind to what I think anyone would have to recognize as the bankruptcy of the situation as I am reporting it to you by people within who are professing to describe their circumstances. If we, to whatever degree, have been following along that line, you can see that we will have sapped our own base, philosophically and culturally and spiritually, which could serve as such a great benefit for the country at this moment of massive crisis on the basis of these descriptions in the moral order and in the intellectual order.

So, what I want to suggest now is this. One of the reasons, perhaps, that we have gone in the direction that is called secularism, that is, the effort to make our institutions more and more like

secular institutions, one of the reasons we've done this is that some people thought that this is a way of responding to Vatican II, that the great ecumenical council that ended in 1965 was, in effect, telling us that everything is up for grabs, that we've got to start over and we've got to read the signs of the times. One of John XXIII's metaphors was: "We're going to open up the windows." Well, you wonder which way the traffic is going to go if you open up windows! Do we want to admit everything that's going on in the modern world, as if this is just uncritically to be accepted? Or, does reading the signs of the times mean that you apply the canons of religious faith to the world in which we find ourselves and then try to evangelize more appropriately in terms of that estimate? Many people thought that it was a matter of signing on to modernity, and sometimes it was stated almost that way: "We need to get with the modern mind." People would tell you that the modern mind cannot accept _____, and you can fill that in with just about any dogma, with any article of the creed. Presumably, then, we were supposed to redefine it so the modern mind could fail to recite the Creed or something. But this was thought to be a species of evangelizing. Now this was, by anyone's estimate -- and I'm exaggerating to some extent -- a misreading of Vatican II. But what went along with it -- and this brings me now to Jacques Maritain -- what went along with it was the notion that the Vatican Council had taken place at a time prior to which there were dark ages in the church, where there was a cultural wasteland, a spiritual wasteland, and you just wouldn't believe how bad things were in the preconciliar church. And John XXIII, looking like Friar Tuck or everybody's favorite uncle, he said, "Let's clear it up," and he opened up the windows, and suddenly we got out of that terrible preconciliar period, and so forth.

Now some of us were alive in those days, and this doesn't quite match our memories of what was going on. When one thinks of the tremendous growth of the Church, for example, in the United States, when you think of the foundation of this college and Catholic colleges all across the country, when you think of high schools and parish schools, when you think of parish plants, when you think of this tremendous activity on just the building and evangelizing level -- that's pretty impressive. When you think of such things as the liturgical movement, which began in St. John's University in Minnesota long before the Council, when you think of the Catholic rural life movement, when you think of publishers like Sheed and Ward, when you think of writers such as Chesterton and Belloc and Graham Green, Francois Mauriac and so forth -- it's possible for someone like myself, in a particularly optimistic mood, to say that was a *golden* period of the church. Far from being a dark age, that was a golden period.

Well, perhaps we don't have to call it the one or the other, but I think it's worth our attention to look at some of the things that were going on there. And what I want to draw your attention to today is one person who played a tremendous role in the preconciliar church, and that is Jacques Maritain, who was born in 1882 and died in 1973. He was a Frenchman and a convert to Catholicism. When he became a Catholic, he married young, a young woman Raissa, who was a Jewish girl whose family had moved from Russia. They met at the Sorbonne. Jacques came from a Lutheran family, but he'd lost his faith -- they'd both lost their faith, and largely, as was the case, by going to school. They took courses at the Sorbonne, and one day in a famous event that they wrote about, in the Jardin des Plantes in Paris they looked at one other and said, "If these guys are right, then there's no reason to be alive." There's no reason to be alive. We're just blobs of matter. Life and death is just a rearrangement of electrons or something, so what's the point of it?

And they resolved that if they had not found, within one year, a reason to go on -- and this was a young married couple -- if they could see no reason to go on, they would commit suicide.

Now two things happened to them within the course of the next year. One, they went to the lectures of Henri Bergson at the College de France. Now, you might read Bergson, but it's hard for us to recapture the role that he played in the last third of the 19th century in Paris. One way (is) if you know Paul Claudel, the great French poet and diplomat who has an essay called "*Ma conversion*." He tells about a Christmas Eve when he went to (the cathedral of) Notre Dame, and he was thinking maybe he would get inspiration to write an almost blasphemous or sacrilegious poem from the liturgy in Notre Dame. He went to the Christmas midnight Mass and was just completely overwhelmed. From that he dated his conversion. So, if you go to Notre Dame in Paris and you walk into the sanctuary of the choir and you look at the pillar and look down you read: "ici c'est converti Paul Claudel" (here's where Paul Claudel converted). It's a national monument now. But when Claudel speaks of his conversion, he talks about how depressing -- and this is a poet -- how depressing cultural life in France was because of the materialism. It's just that if everybody was just matter and so forth, what's the life of the imagination as compared to that? For Maritain, what's the life of the mind? If this is just some sort of physical event that doesn't distinguish itself from any other physical events, then who cares? So, for Claudel too, his conversion takes place against the sense of this oppressive materialism.

For him, for many Frenchmen, Bergson played a great role in opening up philosophy beyond materialism. Bergson made metaphysics respectable again. And Maritain, although he was very critical of him in his very first book (which will be published by Notre Dame Press later this year!), twenty-five years after its publication, he recognized that that was a bumptious sort of young man's book and he owed a tremendous debt to Henri Bergson.

The second thing that happened was that Raissa and Jacques Maritain got in touch with a French writer, Leon Bloy, a novelist, pamphleteer, ferocious individual, whose novel *The Woman Who Was Poor* was something people my age read with tears in their eyes. They met him (he's a Catholic) when he lived in Montmartre. They went up there, up that long stairway, and they talked with him and so forth; and the living faith was far more persuasive (I'm sure) to them than any arguments and discussion. Eventually they came into the church and he was their godfather.

Now what happened next? What happened next brings me back to my opening point. Maritain and his wife, having become Catholics, turned to the study of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Now why? Well, you might say there was a Leonian Revival going on. In 1879 Leo XIII issued an encyclical, *Aeterni Patris*, from which we normally date the Thomistic Revival. Why did Leo the XIII write *Aeterni Patris*? What was the point of the Thomistic Revival? Was it just to have (kind of) our guy? Let's all get behind Thomas and push up his stock. Let's all talk the same. Was it that? When you look at *Aeterni Patris* today, when you look back from a century later, when there is this almost unanimous notion that the enlightenment experiment has failed, you read Leo III in 1879, when not many people thought it had failed at all. Here you have this frail little man, the first prisoner of the Vatican, who is in effect looking out over a fairly prosperous and seemingly successful modernity and is saying "This is fatally flawed; this is rotten to the core." And in order for

humanity -- he's speaking not just of the church -- in order for humanity to survive, we have to rethink the basic presuppositions of modernity. It is a truly prophetic encyclical.

What are the two things that Leo XIII sees as important in a return to Thomas? He's not trying to turn us into Medievalists. He's not trying to get us to look backwards. What he's trying to do is to get us to rethink truths that are still there. They're truths about the way things are. And there are two main sorts. On the one hand an objective morality, and on the other the conviction that the human mind is fashioned to know reality.

Now these are two philosophical points, there is nothing peculiarly Christian about them. But as Leo makes clear, you can't have Christianity without a sound view of mankind and of human destiny and of the way things are. ("The supernatural builds on the natural," as we say.) You can't have one without the other, so the church has to be concerned about this cultural and philosophical issue. In particular, as Leo saw long before anyone else, there was a fatal flaw in the assumptions of modern culture. And the remedy for that, he thought, was to rethink the moral objectivity and the epistemological realism (to give them fancy names) of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Not as a medieval theory, not as a Thomistic theory, but as a common patrimony of the human race.

When Jacques Maritain turned to the study of Thomas Aquinas, he wasn't joining a clique or a club. He was addressing things that were absolutely essential for the progress and health of the human community. That's the Church's interest in philosophy. That's the Church's interest in Thomas. That was Maritain's interest in Thomas Aquinas. And he became one of the leaders of the Thomistic Revival. And he's impossible to read (say from the second and the third quarters of our century), without seeing the tremendous role that he played in Europe, in the United States as an ambassador, as a French ambassador. He was the French delegate to the UN in 1948 (50 years ago) when the *Universal Declaration on Human Rights* was written. He has worked in aesthetics, as Dr. Kerr has mentioned. He had a tremendous influence on many working artists. He wasn't simply a philosopher talking about art. When people like Flannery O'Connor read Jacques Maritain, they said "This is it, he's got it! That's what it's like to write fiction. That's what I'm trying to do." So his range was just enormous.

And it seems to me that, while it is possible to look back at the preconciliar period, to find ways and instances where Thomism wasn't done as well as it might have been done, that isn't really the way we ought to appraise it. We ought to look at instances when it was done superlatively well. And Maritain is an instance of that. His books are still being read; I think he still has a destiny to fulfill within the Church. Just as it's possible for us, at this juncture some thirty years after the Council, to think that it's time that the Vatican Council really began to have its effect.

When the pope issued *Tertio Millennio Adveniente*, the great encyclical talking about these last years before the third millennium, he links it to Vatican II. The *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, this is the catechism of Vatican II. It's as if we're just getting all of these things in place so that the Council can now really begin to have its effect. And one of the places where it's got to have its effect in a real robust way is in Catholic colleges and universities. One of the documents of John Paul II that addresses directly the two points that I've tried to make here tonight is *Veritatis Splendor*. In that encyclical, you remember, the Holy Father is saying: "Look, over the course of

these past years, we've addressed this issue, this moral problem, that moral problem. Things come up and we've had to talk about them. But what I want to do in this one, in *The Splendor of Truth*, I want to lay out the Christian moral ideal in all its amplitude. And having done that, I want to say something (and he does) about things that are going on in Catholic moral theology, which really are not very helpful."

But what he does when he lays out the thing in all its amplitude and positively, as you know, is to take that passage of Matthew where the rich young man comes to Jesus and says, "What must I do to be saved?" And as the Pope says, "He's not asking about what job should I get (and so on). It's a deep question about the meaning of human life." And the Pope sees this as a very attractive moment in life. Of course, those of us who are in faculties, we're always dealing with people who are at that juncture in their lives when they really want to know "What does it mean? What's it all about?" So Jesus responds, and he says, "Keep the commandments." And then he says, "Well, what are they...," and he lists them (not all of them, but a significant number). And the young man says, "I think I do that." And it's clear that Jesus thinks he does, too. (Hey, that's a lot.) But what the Pope takes that to mean is: "Look, the commandments are absolutely important, but they just open the door to the moral life. They just open the door to the Christian life." It's not just a matter of the parameters beyond which and so forth, but they create the context within which there is the kind of expansion we heard about this afternoon when the winner of the essay contest read her paper, that notion of a perfection that goes far beyond minimalism and so forth.

Jacques Maritain, I think, is there as a continuing model of the sort of thing that we have to get back into our understanding of what we're doing in Catholic education. It's there, of course, but sometimes it's been weakened, it's been watered down a bit, or we're a little sheepish about it. We're almost apologetic about it. "This is a good school, though Catholic." You know, this kind of thing. Or, "Can't a university be excellent, though Catholic?" It's almost as if there is some kind of impediment here. Just historically, it's perhaps useful to remember that the first universities were Catholic. They come, as the Pope says in a magnificent document relative to this, *Ex corde Ecclesiae*. they come "out of the heart of the church." Thirteenth century, fourteenth century, they spread across Europe. Just an explosion of universities out of the heart of the church.

The question is not whether a university can be Catholic, but what happened that universities have become secularized? Now that's a huge topic in terms of higher education in this country, and a lot of people are writing about it. There's some terribly important books about the secularization of those institutions that were founded by many Christian denominations. The Methodists have a tremendous record of the universities that they've founded. Not a single one of them is a Methodist university anymore! And what some people have said, "We've got to watch it, that that doesn't happen to us." We've got to watch it.

But that's just sort of a negative attempt. I think we've got to get back to this rich sense of gratitude for our tradition and for our patrimony, and to realize that historically. That's the cultural current that takes us back through Shakespeare and Chaucer and Dante and so on. That's the mainstream. That's where we are. And we represent that. We have to represent that in our own country and beyond, first of all as a cultural thing, but also because it prepares the way for something which is ever so much more important.

One of the things the Maritains did when they were young, was to have meetings at their home in a suburb of Paris. They began very informal. They would ask a few poets, a few artists, a few philosophers out for the weekend, and someone would give a talk. Then it became a quasi- retreat, but not too heavy. It was a cultural sort of thing, but it had a tremendous impact on any number of people, a whole generation of French intellectuals: poets, dramatists, philosophers, thinkers, journalists, painters. And they formalized it and called it the *Cercle d'etudes Thomistes*, the Thomistic Study Circle. And they actually drew up a kind of rule for it. And Maritain, in his notebook, in the appendix, reprints this kind rule for being a member of the *Cercle d'etudes*.

They were particularly interested in lay people, who are themselves given to the intellectual life, because, as they said: "Religious understand that the life of the mind is part of a bigger package. It's part of their spiritual life. But lay people can very easily be led astray in thinking this is some kind of career that is being divorced from the deeper meaning of their lives." So they were very concerned that the life of the mind not be separated from the life of prayer, from the spiritual life, generally from the great effort which characterizes the Christian life. And that is an effort, which, to end, Leon Bloy summarized in a sentence that was a haunting sentence. And when you think of it, you can get some sense of the influence he had on this young couple that came to him twenty years old. At the end of *The Woman Who Was Poor*, Bloy writes this sentence. "There's only one tragedy -- not to be a saint." I think that's one tragedy, we can be sure, Raissa and Jacques Maritain avoided. And so may we all. Thank you.
